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This thesis examines whether the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) marks a 
new stage in the development of Salafi-jihadism. Based on a thorough examination of 
primary and secondary sources, this study concludes that the emergence of ISIS 
introduced three significant differences into the Salafi-jihadism world. First, sectarianism 
and the mass application of takfir to excommunicate Muslims have been at the core of 
ISIS’s strategy. Second, ISIS’s establishment of the proto-caliphate is a huge milestone in 
the history of Salafi-jihadism. Third, a propaganda campaign and the professional use of 
media are additional new characteristics that distinguish ISIS from the other Salafi-
jihadist groups. The thesis concludes that ISIS marks a new stage in the development of 
Salafi-jihadism. Although ISIS has attempted to leave an extensive legacy, we believe 
that the establishment of the Islamic caliphate is the only lasting impact that ISIS will 
have on Salafi-jihadism ideology. Despite the terrible reputation ISIS has gained for its 
brutalities, the success that the group had in establishing a proto-caliphate—however 
briefly—will live forever, and may encourage future generations of Salafi-jihadists to 
undertake the same endeavor. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Salafi-jihadism ideology is a relatively new concept that prevailed during the last 
century. Initially, the ideology emerged as a reaction to the imminent collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire.1 Thereafter, the views of successive Islamic scholars and leaders have 
contributed to the radicalization of the ideology. At the same time, adherents, fascinated 
by this view, believed that Salafism was the only way for regenerating the authentic 
principles of so-called true Islam. Consequently, because Muslims in the Middle East 
failed to rebuild an Islamic empire, the extremists sought a way to create Salafi-jihadist 
groups in order to spread their views into the world. Each one of these groups based their 
theories on the Salafi-jihadism ideology. 
The extremists may vary in principles and approaches but they mostly agree when 
it comes to their ultimate goal: reviving parts of the original Islamic Caliphate and 
applying Sharia law. Their shared objectives include removing the secular regimes in 
certain Muslim countries and reforming the political and cultural way of life by adopting 
a very narrow interpretation of the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad 
(known as hadith). 
Recently, the Salafi-jihadism ideology has been adopted by several militant 
movements, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), al-Qaeda, Boko Haram 
in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Jabhat al-
Nusra in Syria, Ansar Dine in Mali, and many more in Afghanistan and Pakistan.2 In 
particular, the world has witnessed ISIS emerge as the most prominent movement, which 
is notable for its extreme violence around the world, geographical expansion, economic 
and military power, along with a worldwide attraction among the youth.  
This thesis addresses the development of the Salafi-jihadism ideology, with a 
deep concentration on ISIS. Initially, we track the development of the ideology by 
                                                 
1 Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 65. 
2 Daniel Byman, “Fighting Salafi-Jihadist Insurgencies: How Much Does Religion Really Matter?” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36, no. 5 (2013):353. 
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highlighting the contribution that each of the main Salafi-jihadist theorists has made. 
Afterward, the discussion focuses on ISIS’s contribution to the development of a new era 
in the history of Salafi-jihadism. The thesis concludes with a discussion on the possible 
implications of ISIS’s ideology after the group is defeated, and we then consider the 
lasting impact of its ideology on that of Salafi-jihadism.  
For the sake of accuracy and inclusivity, the thesis briefly touches some main 
events that occurred from the medieval era until the present. This historical background 
sheds light on the influence of key historical figures such as Ibn Taymiyya in the 
thirteenth century, whose teachings shape the core of modern Salafi-jihadist ideology.3 
Understanding the root motivations and ideas of Salafi-jihadism better enables us to 
visualize the lasting impacts of the ideology. Nevertheless, the study does not examine a 
detailed historical chronology, but instead, it considers some touchpoints throughout the 
evolution of Salafi-jihadism in order to delineate the original underpinnings from recent 
contributions to this ideology.  
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much has been written about ISIS since the organization became public. Subject 
matter experts, scholars, and journalists frequently publish books and articles in which 
they analyze ISIS’s history, what the group represents, and how it came to power; some 
even write recipes for how to defeat ISIS. In this section, we briefly review a few of these 
publications that directly or indirectly serve the purpose of the research process. The 
literature is categorized into two main camps. Initially, we highlight some of the most 
well-known authors on the subject, who see ISIS’s ideology as an extension of Salafi-
jihadism movement. We then discuss the views of other scholars, who analyze ISIS’s 
ideology from a revolutionary warfare framework.  
The thesis carefully analyzes these different approaches in order to look at the 
ISIS ideology from multiple perspectives. We pay particular attention to the origins that 
lie behind Salafi-jihadist ideology, and the transformation that it went through under 
                                                 
3 Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone 
Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 72. 
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ISIS’s leadership. This study aims to contribute by clearly depicting this transformation 
so policies can be adjusted to address and counter the expansion of globalized Salafi-
jihadism. Unlike the existing literature, this research is unique in that it considers the 
future of the Salafi-jihadist ideology. In our concluding chapter, we argue whether ISIS 
ideology will leave a permanent mark on Salafi-jihadism. 
1. ISIS as a New Wave of Salafi-Jihadism Ideology 
Daniel Byman, a professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown 
University, asserts that ISIS, sometimes referred to as the Islamic State, and al-Qaeda 
differ on both tactics and strategy, and they are competing for the lead of the overall 
jihadist movement.4 In contrast to al-Qaeda, Byman argues, ISIS does not see itself as a 
vanguard in the fight against the West to arouse the Muslim world, but rather, ISIS wants 
to build a state, purify it, and later expand.5 Moreover, the Islamic State’s implementation 
of many Wahhabi teachings is also a substantial difference that Byman points out when 
he compares ISIS with al-Qaeda. Yonah and Dean Alexander share a similar point of 
view with Byman. They assert that the principal difference between the two terror 
organizations has been in their focus.6 Although evolving, the authors argue, ISIS mostly 
focuses inward seeking to build an Islamic state, whereas al-Qaeda and its affiliates have 
aimed to push jihad globally.7 In addition, the authors note that the Islamic State has 
brought the employment of the social media campaign to a new level. 
In his 2015 book, ISIS: A History, Fawaz A. Gerges argues that ISIS marks a 
new wave of Salafi-jihadism in many aspects, comparing the group to its predecessors in 
terms of size, statehood, leadership ambitions, area of operation, the area of interest (far 
enemy and near enemy), and sectarianism.8  
                                                 
4 Ibid., 168. 
5 Ibid., 170. 
6 Yonah Alexander and Dean Alexander, The Islamic State: Combating the Caliphate Without Borders 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 38. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS: A History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 224–231. 
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Leaning in the same direction as Gerges are Malcolm Nance in Defeating ISIS: 
Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe; Michael Weiss and Hassan 
Hassan in ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror; Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger in ISIS: The 
State of Terror; and Patrick Cockburn in The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New 
Sunni Revolution. According to Nance, ISIS has managed to surpass al-Qaeda and 
become a cult of Jihad, whose core values and ideology have Osama bin Laden as a 
single point of origin.9 Moreover, Nance asserts that ISIS ideology is like a hemorrhagic 
virus, and much more contagious than al-Qaeda’s.10  
The Syrian expert on tribal and jihadist dynamics, Hassan Hassan, and journalist 
Michael Weiss explain what ISIS is seeking to accomplish and why it is such a threat to 
the world. The authors examine the evolution and adaptation of ISIS over the past 
decade, which have transformed ISIS into a greater threat than any other previous Salafi-
jihadist organization.11 The authors explain how ISIS’s war started and against whom; 
more importantly, the authors detail how Shia and other minority sects and ethnicities are 
ISIS’s primary targets.  
Jessica Stern and John M. Berger argue that ISIS has made its name by using 
beheadings and all kinds of savage acts as a form of marketing and recruitment, trying to 
introduce and infuse in us a state of terror.12 The authors assert that ISIS “pushes the 
boundaries of the definition of insurgency,” and believe that ISIS, despite its short, 
contradictory, and full-of-surprises history, has launched significant changes in strategy, 
messaging, and recruitment that will last long after its defeat.13 
Patrick Cockburn highlights the role of Syrian and Iraq conflicts in shaping the 
new landscape of jihadism that ISIS controls. Among other points, he asserts that “Jihadi 
                                                 
9 Malcolm Nance, Defeating ISIS: Who They Are, How They Fight, What They Believe (New York: 
Skyhorse Publishing, Inc., 2016), 192. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2016), 6. 
12 Jessica Stern and John M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (Ney York: Harper Collins, 2015), 3. 
13 Ibid., 11. 
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fighters combined religious fanaticism and military expertise to win spectacular and 
unexpected victories against Iraq, Syrian, and Kurdish forces.”14 
Lastly, Graeme Wood, in his highly discussed article, What ISIS Really Wants, 
argues that the West mistakenly continues to see jihadism as monolithic; ISIS, he asserts, 
has already eclipsed Al Qaeda.15 Further, in his article he points out the differences 
between ISIS and Al Qaeda, describing the first one as a group full of energy and 
creativity.  
2. ISIS Ideology as a Revolutionary Movement  
A few other scholars have come up with a different approach when analyzing 
ISIS’s ideology. Scott Atran, a senior research fellow at the University of Oxford, argues 
that ISIS’s ideology is not something new, and the violence of the organization is similar 
to the revolutionary violence of many other groups who came before.16 Furthermore, he 
asserts that “asymmetric operations involving spectacular killings to destabilize the social 
order is a tactic that has been around as long as recorded history.”17 Within the 
framework of revolutionary warfare, Craig Whiteside, in “The Islamic State and the 
Return of Revolutionary Warfare,” draws a parallel between ISIS and the Vietnamese 
communists.18 Whiteside argues that the Salafi-jihadist movement adopted the 
revolutionary warfare approach after the Afghan-Soviet War, “due to the similarity of its 
struggle against powerful enemies and proxies that dominated an international system 
inherently incompatible with their ideology.”19 Lastly, Jonathan S. Baker, in his thesis, 
Harbingers of the Caliphate: Islamic State Revolutionary Actions 2011–2014, at Naval 
Postgraduate School, develops a “model of revolutionary movement growth” in order to 
                                                 
14 Patrick Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution (Brooklyn, NY: 
Verso, 2015), 5. 
15 Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants.” The Atlantic 315, no. 2 (2015): 79. 
16 Scott Atran, “ISIS Is a Revolution.” Aeon, December 15, 2015, https://aeon. co/essays/why-isis-has-
the-potential-to-be-a-world-altering-revolution. 
17 Ibid.  
18 Craig Whiteside, “The Islamic State and the Return of Revolutionary Warfare,” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies 27, no. 5 (2016): 743–776. 
19 Ibid., 744.  
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“evaluate the significant Islamic State actions…, and how the actions contribute to 
movement’s growth in Iraq and Syria.”20 Baker concludes that ISIS has used, although 
not in a sequential order, a model of revolutionary movement growth from 2011 to 2014 
to return to prominence.21  
Lastly, quite different from the mainstream is the Salafi-jihadi analyst Ahmed Al 
Hamdan in Methodological Difference Between ISIS and Al Qaida. Al Hamdan asserts 
that ISIS ideology has deviated from the methodology of the Salafi-jihadist movement, 
and therefore, it is not an extension of it.22 One of the main premises in his argument is 
that ISIS has been declaring those who disagree with them as innovators, and by 
defaming them, ISIS has been destroying the boundary of unity in issues of individual 
opinion; a practice that is not followed by Salafi-jihadists.23  
B. APPROACH 
The thesis utilizes qualitative data to analyze the research question. The primary 
source of information is the relevant literature, such as books and articles written in 
English and Arabic by subject matter experts. Moreover, public documents, statements, 
as well as videos of ISIS and other Salafi-jihadist groups are examined in order to better 
understand the evolution of Salafi-jihadist ideology.  
Another important source of information is the interviews that the authors 
conducted with Jordanian officials from Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) in August 2017. 
Jordan has a long tradition of fighting different Salafi-jihadist groups. The geographical 
proximity to the proto-caliphate established by ISIS makes Jordan a particularly 
important element in the fight against ISIS. Hence, interviews with high-ranking officers 
                                                 
20 Jonathan S. Baker, “Harbingers of the Caliphate: Islamic State Revolutionary Actions 2011–2014” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 1. 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/49330/16Jun_Baker_Jonathan.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed
=y.  
21 Ibid., 69–71.  
22 Ahmed Al Hamdan, “Methodological Differences between ISIS and Al Qaid: Who Are the Ones 
that Deviated?” Al Muwahideen Media, February 27, 2016, 
https://almuwahideenmedia.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/methodological.pdf.  
23 Ibid.  
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of the Jordanian military further shed light on the research question. Fighting against ISIS 
and other Salafi-jihadist groups is part of Jordanians’ official day-to-day working routine, 
so their insights constitute a valuable element in the research process. The questions we 
have asked are the following:  
1. The Kingdom of Jordan has been fighting the extremist Salafi-jihadist 
groups for quite a while. How is the fight against ISIS different? 
2. What recruiting tools are ISIS and al-Qaeda using? What are the 
characteristics of the recruiters?  
3. Is ISIS’s propaganda distinct from that of other Salafi-jihadist groups? 
4. Is there any distinction between ISIS in Syria and ISIS in Iraq?  
5. What is new in ISIS (if anything) in regards to Salafi-jihadism ideology? 
6. What is the status of the Coalition campaign against ISIS? Are there 
indications it will end soon? 
7. If ISIS is soon defeated, are there indications about other Salafi-jihadist 
groups willing to take their place?  
8. Will ISIS’s new ideology leave a permanent mark on Salafi-jihadist 
ideology?  
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter II 
provides an overview of the key elements of this research: Salafism, Jihadism, and 
Wahhabism. Chapter III contains a discussion of the conceptual basis that forms the 
Salafi-jihadist ideological narrative, and emphasizes the key thoughts that have shaped 
the ideology. Chapter IV combines insights from relevant literature and the interviews to 
depict clearly ISIS’s “contribution” to the Salafi-jihadist ideology. In Chapter V, we draw 
our conclusions. Instead of simply presenting historical facts about ISIS and Salafi-
jihadism, the aim is to build different approaches to address the phenomenon. Even so, 
 8 
we believe that it is essential to fully understand the origins of Salafi-jihadism and its 
transformation under ISIS leadership. The thesis also considers the future of Salafi-
jihadist ideology. In the end, drawing from our deep analyses, the thesis argues whether 
ISIS’s ideology will leave permanent marks on Salafi-jihadism.  
 9 
II. SALAFISM, JIHADISM, AND WAHHABISM  
In Chapter I, we introduced the research question and outlined our approach in 
this thesis. In this chapter, we examine terminologies and key concepts. Even though 
Salafi-jihadism is our focus, the ideology is part of a broader Salafi spectrum. That said, 
after a brief note on the Islamic legal sources of Islam as a religion, we discuss the 
general philosophy of Salafism. We then explain the concept of jihad and jihadism, and 
in the final section of this chapter, we also address Wahhabism because the conservative 
movement is believed to particularly influence ISIS’s ideology.24 
In general, Muslims of all sects are supposed to live according to the doctrines 
and teachings of Islam. These rules of living must strictly derive and be interpreted from 
Islamic legal sources: the Quran, Hadith, Ijtihad and Qiyas.25 The Quran, the holy book 
that was revealed to Prophet Mohammed, is the first fundamental source of the Islamic 
law. The second source—the Sunnah—is everything else that came from the Prophet 
besides the Quran. In other words, the Sunnah is the record of the Prophet’s acts, deeds, 
and teachings that further detail and explain the Quran. Ijtihad—a much-discussed topic 
by Salafi thinkers—is the third source of the Islamic law. Ijtihad is considered by Muslim 
scholars a broad source that enables Islamic law to adapt to contemporary situations and 
issues not covered by Quran and the Sunnah. The Islamic scholars/lawyers (ulama) are 
the ones responsible to analyze and explain the best ways to solve contemporary issues 
based on their interpretation of Quran and Sunnah. Ijtihad can be rather complicated and 
controversial since it is derived from different individuals’ understanding and 
interpretations of various verses of the Quran and deeds of the Prophet. The fourth source 
is al-Qiyas. Literally, al-Qiyas denotes evaluating the external borders and the internal 
ingredients of something, or making scientific analogy to set equivalence between two 
things. From the religion point of view, al-Qiyas is “the extension of a Shariah ruling 
                                                 
24 Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State, 6. 
25 Abrar Hasan, Independence of Judiciary and Judicial Crisis (Pakistan: Createspace, May 21, 2013), 
21. 
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from an original case (Asl) to a new case (Far’) because the new case has the same 
effective cause (Illah) as the original case.”26 
A. SALAFISM 
Salafism is a movement that supports going back to the practices of the first three 
generations of Muslims. Salafiyya, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, refers to 
“a strictly orthodox Sunni Muslim reform movement advocating a return to the early 
Islam of the Qur’an and the Sunna.” From an Arabic language point of view, salaf means 
past or refers to the past. Salafi philosophy is particularly founded on the following 
hadith (Prophet’s saying): “The best of people is my generation, then those who come 
after them, then those who come after them.”27 The first three generations are commonly 
known as al-salaf al-salah—the Pious Forefathers. Prophet Muhammad and his 
companions, also known as the Sahaba, are included in the first one. The next generation 
is known as al-tabi’in and includes the successors who were born after the Prophet’s 
death. The last best generation, referred to as tabi al-tabi’in, includes the Muslim 
population that lived after the second generation. 
Salafists argue that Islam, at that certain period, was in its golden age, pure and 
without any kind of distortions. Moreover, this age is considered a time when Muslims 
properly understood the religion and applied it in a perfect way.28 Ibn Taymiyyah, when 
commenting a verse from the Quran, described non-Salafists as:  
All who contradict and oppose the Messenger after the right path has been 
clearly shown to them, have followed other than the Path of the Believers; 
and all who follow other than the Path of the Believers have contradicted 
and opposed the Messenger after the right Path has been shown to them. If 
one thinks that he is following the Path of the Faithful Believers and is 
                                                 
26 Shah Abdul Hannan, “Islamic Jurisprudence (Usul Al Fiqh): Qiyas,” Muslim Tents, accessed 
October 12, 2017, http://www.muslimtents.com/aminahsworld/Islamic_jurisprudence_qiyas.html.  
27 Abu ‘Iyad Al-Salafi, “A Brief Introduction to the Salafi Dawah,” Salafi publication, accessed June 
24, 2017, http://www.salafipublications.com/sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=SLF02&articleID=SLF02000 
1&pfriend.  
28 Shiraz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
7. 
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mistaken, he is in the same position as one who thinks he is following the 
Messenger and is mistaken.29 
Salafi ideology, in principle, is about introducing the idea of tawhid—the unity of God—
and the idea of doctrine purity (aqida) in order to go back to authenticity. However, the 
idea does not refer only to monotheism. For Salafists, tawhid is also about rejecting 
innovations (e.g., visiting the shrine graves), practices that consequently relate to unbelief 
(kufr) and polytheism (shirk) because they assign partners to God.30 Therefore, Salafists 
argue that Muslims should be freed from the traditional rules that have been mixed with 
the religion.  
Salafism is a belief system that represents a broad range of adherents, generally 
divided into three categories, of which violent jihadists comprise only a small percentage. 
Quintan Wiktorowicz asserts that “the community is broad enough to include such 
diverse figures as Osama bin Laden and the Mufti of Saudi Arabia.”31 Wiktorowicz 
divides Salafists into purists (considered conservatives by some other scholars), politicos 
(also defined as the theological category), and jihadists. This categorization has been 
widely accepted by other scholars since Wiktorowitz published his research in 2006.32  
This thesis focus, indeed, is on the third category—the jihadists—which we refer 
to as Salafi-jihadists. According to Shiraz Maher, there are five essential features of 
contemporary Salafi-jihadism: tawhid (the unity of God); hakimiyya (what the Islamic 
authority looks like and who to serve); al-wala wa-l-bara (loyalty and disavowal; al-wala 
refers to loyalty to God, Islam, and other Muslims; al-bara refers to disavowal of the 
polytheists and their allies); jihad; and takfir (excommunicating or dismissing Muslims 
from the faith of Islam).33 However, subject matter experts’ ideas vary when it comes to 
the characteristics that define Salafism or Salafi-jihadism. Alvi Hayyat argues that the 
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concepts of “Unification of Governance” and of dar al-Islam and dar al-Kufr are key 
characteristics of Salafism as well.34 The “Unification of Governance” has to do with the 
refusal of all man-made laws and the unification of all Muslims under one governance 
(Caliphate). On the other hand, dar al-Islam refers to the territory where the Muslims 
live, while dar al-Kufr refers to the territory inhabited by the unbelievers. 
B. JIHADISM 
Jihad, likely the most well known and yet the least understood Islamic term by the 
general Western public, does not solely refer to literal war. The word jihad stems from 
the root word jahada, which means to struggle or exert effort.35 Jihad is “a personal 
attempt to seek God’s will, resist temptation, and strive to be a better Muslim or a 
collective effort to improve one’s community as well as defend it or expand it by means 
of warfare.”36 The concept of jihad in Islam is categorized into two types, al-qital—
warfare—considered the “jihad of the sword” or “the lesser jihad”; and jihad al-nafs—the 
greater jihad—the struggle against one’s own diabolical tendencies in order to be 
accepted by God as a good believer.37  
It must be noted that jihad in the holy Quran, like in the following verse, is 
described as a self-defense act: “Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are 
being fought, because they were wronged. And indeed, Allah is competent to give them 
victory.”38 In fact, the majority of orthodox Muslim scholars believe that “jihad’s 
objective has never been to fight all unbelievers…, and physically fighting is not a 
permanent condition against unbelievers, but only when treaties are broken or aggression 
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has been made against Muslim territory.”39 On the other hand, inviting non-Muslims is 
considered as a continuous jihad as per the hadith: “I have been ordered to fight the 
people until they declare that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is His 
Messenger, establish prayers, and pay zakat. If they perform all that, their blood and 
property are guaranteed protection on my behalf except when justified by Islamic 
laws.”40 Linguistic scholars of hadith argue that the word “fight” in the hadith does refer 
to struggle and not combat, therefore, “not forcing anyone to become Muslim at the point 
of a sword.”41 Nevertheless, the concept of jihad remains a highly contested one among 
scholars.  
Current usage of the jihad concept as applied to political and social life is not 
new. In Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, Rudolph Peters lays out three traditional 
key functions of the doctrine of jihad. Primarily, jihad was used to mobilize and 
encourage Muslims to fight the unbelievers since jihad is considered a religious duty.42 
Secondly, Peters continues, jihad was used to increase the credibility of a leader, because 
declaring jihad was one of the main tasks of a lawful caliph.43 Lastly, the doctrine of 
jihad served as a set of rules that guided foreign policy and the relationships with foreign 
powers.44 
Salafi-jihadist scholars have elevated the position of jihad so much that they 
consider it a foremost obligation for Muslims once they accept Islam as their religion. In 
the view of Salafi-jihadists, jihad is an ibada in the path of God—a fundamental act of 
worship like the other five pillars of Islam, such as prayer or the pilgrimage. 
Contemporary jihadist movements use comments by ancient scholars such as Ibn Nuhaas, 
                                                 
39 Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, and Shaykh Seraj Hendricks, “Jihad: A Misunderstood 
Concept from Islam,” The Islamic Supreme Council of America, accessed July 25, 2017, 
http://islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/legal-rulings/5-jihad-a-misunderstood-concept-from-
islam.html.  
40 Related by Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim. 
41 Shaykh Muhammad Hisham, The Islamic Supreme Council of America, accessed July 28, 2017, 
http://islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/legal-rulings/5-jihad-a-misunderstood-concept-from-
islam.html.  
42 Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 1996), 5. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid.  
 14 
who still retains his popularity, in order to convince jihadist adherents about their radical 
view of jihad. Ibn Nuhaas interpreted a quote from the Quran saying that “If it weren’t 
for Allah checking the nonbelievers through the believers and giving the believers 
authority to protect Islam and break the armies of disbelief, [then] disbelief would have 
reigned on earth and the true religion would have been eliminated. This proves that 
whatever is in this status [i.e., jihad] deserves to be a pillar of iman [faith].”45 Similarly, 
Sayyid Qutb considered jihad as “the holy war to subjugate Islamic teachings and expand 
Islam.”46 Moreover, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the initial leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), 
said “next to faith, there is nothing more important than repulsing an assailant enemy 
who ruins the religion and the world.”47  
Salafi-jihadists often exploit, even against Islamic law, the concept of jihadism to 
motivate supporters to fight. Salafi-jihadists have constantly elaborated new 
interpretations of the concept of jihad, so they could invoke it at any time to legitimize 
their activities against any target regardless of religion, race, or nationality. In fact, the 
Imam (the highest religious representative in the country) used to be the one in charge of 
declaring jihad. Currently, in most of the Muslim countries, the ruler of the country is the 
one who bears the authority to declare jihad. Any other call for jihad is considered 
illegitimate by orthodox Muslims and, therefore, refused on religious grounds.48     
 One of the key features of jihad that contemporary Salafi-jihadist movements 
often exploit is the Islamic principle of qisas, which refers to retaliation in an innovative 
way in order to justify the targeting of civilians.49 “An eye for an eye” would be the 
comparable idea.50 The Qisas concept is typically used as a justice instrument for 
individuals involved in cases of murder; however, Salafi-jihadists have been particularly 
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innovative by applying this particular concept to international affairs.51 ISIS in its well-
known magazine—Dabiq—labeled many of its international terror assaults (e.g., the 
Paris attacks) as “just terror” in response to what the group perceives as hostilities against 
Muslim countries from the Western ones.52 
C. WAHHABISM  
Somewhat similar to Salafism, Wahhabism advocates for a return to “purity”; 
however, Wahhabism takes that farther. Wahhabism is a branch of the Salafist movement 
that arose in the Arabian Peninsula in the eighteenth century with the purpose of 
reforming the secular political provisions within Islamic principles (see Figure 1).53  
 
Figure 1.  Wahhabism depicted in relation to Salafism and Islam. 
The ideology is based on the teachings of Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, whose 
mission was to revive pure worship and devotion to Allah alone. The movement is also 
known as Adwa lil Tawhid (call of unity) and its adherents as Ahl Tawhid (the people of 
unity). Interestingly, the movement grew up in a vast, thinly populated area in central 
Arabia but managed to come to dominance and resulted in the founding of the Saudi 
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state.54 Today, Saudi Arabia remains one of the most religious and conservative countries 
in the world, and the ruling family is strongly connected to the clergy of Wahhabism. 
Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s symbolic position as the birthplace of Islam and Saudi’s oil 
money allow the country to finance and spread Wahhabi ideology outside the country’s 
borders.55 
Wahhabi ideology in the Arabian Peninsula is a rebirth of Islam based on its pure 
religious doctrines and rules. According to Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, Muslims 
must form a bayah (oath of allegiance) to a Muslim ruler. On the other hand, the ruler has 
to be committed in his allegiance to the people for as long as he governs the society based 
on the laws of God. One of the main tenets of Abd al-Wahhab’s doctrine is the concept of 
takfir. Under the takfiri doctrine, Wahhabis can excommunicate a fellow Muslim if the 
individual engages in activities that are considered by Wahhabis as non-Islamic; 
therefore, those who do not comply with the rules should be murdered (because they 
would be apostates) and their possessions confiscated. Wahhabis believe that, to the list 
of apostates deserving death, should be also included the Shiite, Sufis and other Muslim 
denominations.  
Lastly, Wahhabis strictly reject the reinterpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah 
to settle the new era issues.56 Wahhabis are known for banning specific acts that they 
consider as shirk, such as praying at saints’ tombs, engaging in religious celebrations, and 
adopting foreign dress.57 Moreover, the ban includes alcoholic drinks, tobacco, and other 
stimulants that are intoxicating. Music, dancing, as well as loud laughter and dramatic 
weeping at funerals, have also been banned by Wahhabis.58 The exact interpretations of 
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what shapes the right behavior according to the Quran and hadith have given the 
Wahhabis the title of “Muslim Calvinists.”59  
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Thus far, we have defined the key concepts of the Salafi-jihadism. The ideology is 
part of a broader Salafi spectrum and aims to revive the Islam practiced by the first three 
generations. Salafi-jihadists have constantly elaborated new interpretations of the 
principles of the Islamic law with the purpose of legitimizing and fulfilling their goals. In 
the next chapter, we examine how the definitions of these principles have evolved 
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III. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPTUAL EVOLUTION 
OF SALAFI-JIHADISM 
Having discussed the key concepts of the research in Chapter II, we now trace the 
prominent ideas and philosophies that have shaped the current Salafi-jihadist ideology. 
This chapter has two main objectives. First, we examine the ideas and beliefs of the 
thinkers that continue to motivate extremist Salafi-jihadist organizations such as ISIS. 
Graeme Wood in “What ISIS Really Wants,” asserts that “the Islamic State is no mere a 
collection of psychopaths. It is a religious group with carefully considered beliefs.”60 In 
fact, these ideas and beliefs have been carved by well-known religious scholars, such as 
Ibn Taymiyya, Hasan al Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and others.61 These ideologues have 
offered new understanding and interpretations of the religious texts, and they continue to 
serve as an inspiration for extremists during the present time. In many cases, their works 
are being used as doctrines by terrorist organizations. Second, while discussing, in 
chronological order, the ideas of some of the most influential Salafi-jihadist scholars, we 
also point out the evolution of the Salafi-jihadist ideological concepts over the years. 
Analyzing the evolution of the ideology from its beginning also enables us to depict in 
Chapter IV the potential transformation of that ideology under ISIS leadership.  
A. INTELLECTUAL FATHERS 
Ibn Taymiyyah (1268–1328 CE) was a prestigious and controversial scholar who 
established the intellectual foundation of Salafi-jihadism. He lived during a period of 
political, religious, and social unrest, when the Islamic world was experiencing 
considerable external pressure from the Mongol Dynasty.62 For Ibn Taymiyyah, the 
foreign invasion was an existential threat to the Islamic civilization, so he strived to 
purify the faith by drawing lines between the true believers and the Mongol semi-
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pagans.63 Moreover, Ibn Taymiyyah attempted to create a new order by strictly refusing 
to subordinate the religion to the state, and in one of his fatwas (non-binding juristic 
opinions) against the Mongols, he argued that the Muslims were obliged to overthrow the 
Mongol leader for mixing the Sharia law with Mongols’ law (yasa).64  
Ibn Taymiyyah’s work has been enormously influential to the recent Salafi-
jihadist movements to the extent that citing him is a measure of a person’s knowledge of 
Islam.65 Among the key contributions of Ibn Taymiyyah to Salafi-jihadist ideology is the 
concept of jihad itself. He gave jihad the same importance as the five pillars of Islam, and 
considered jihad an obligation in order to overthrow the forces of new jahiliyya 
(ignorance of God).66 He argued to his fellow Muslims that jihad “is the best voluntary 
[religious] act that a man can perform.”67 A second major contribution of Ibn Taymiyyah 
is the idea of takfir.68 He considered the false Muslims—the Mongols—as more 
dangerous than the other infidels, and therefore, he argued that fighting the false Muslims 
should be a priority.69 Thirdly, Ibn Taymiyyah, in contrast to the ulama of his time, 
believed that there was room for personal interpretation of religious doctrine—ijtihad.70 
He highlighted the importance of ijtihad in his writings, and personally exercised it in 
many issues of Sharia.71 An important consideration for Ibn Taymiyyah’s work arises 
from the historical period in which he livedduring the invasion of Muslim lands by a 
foreign power.72 
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Ibn Taymiyyah’s ideas of jihad, ijtihad, takfir, and jahiliyya have been discussed 
and further developed by contemporary Salafi-jihadist thinkers. One of these prominent 
figures of Salafi-jihadism is Hasan al Banna (1906–1949). His work was hugely 
influenced by the decision of Kemal Ataturk to terminate the caliphate in 1924 and to 
establish the secular state of Turkey. Al Banna’s initial response was the creation of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, whose overall mission since its founding has been to promote a 
revival of Islam.73 The organization’s credo remains “God is our objective; the Quran is 
our constitution; the Prophet is our leader; struggle is our way; and death for the sake of 
God is the highest of our inspirations.”74 Al Banna believed that Sharia provides the most 
comprehensive and flexible set of principles that humankind needs.75 
Al Banna’s revivalist ideas were further advanced in a more radical way by Abdu 
al-Ala Mawdudi (1903–1979) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966). Mawdudi’s work is 
considered an important link between al-Banna’s vague methodical approach and the 
sophisticated philosophy of Sayid Qutb.76 Mawdudi—the founder of the Pakistani 
Islamist political party Jamaat i-Islami—is one of the first thinkers who managed to 
develop a systematic political form of Islam and actually wrote a plan for social action to 
achieve his vision.77 He is generally credited with the revival of the concept of the new 
jahiliya, a concept that was later borrowed by Qutb. Mawdudi believed that Muslims had, 
in fact, overthrown God’s sovereignty and imposed secular governments.78 Moreover, he 
asserted that “Islam is a revolutionary ideology” and the religion “seeks to alter the social 
order of the entire world and rebuild it in conformity with its own tenets and ideals.”79 
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Although Mawdudi is one of the most contemporary influential thinkers of radical 
Islam, Sayyid Qutb is considered by scholars as the one who founded the actual 
movement.80 Qutb, arguably the greatest contributor to the Salafi-jihadist ideology, is a 
product of the Muslim Brotherhood organization. He was once an admirer of the West 
but changed his view after an unhappy experience in the United States. Qutb is broadly 
regarded as the father of uncompromising militant Islam,81 and his work represents a 
clear blueprint for a revolution.82  
Qutb’s strategy to return mankind to the early days of Islam was based on three 
interconnected concepts.83 First, Qutb defined the goal to be achieved—the 
implementation of the Islamic concept of life.84 Second, he pointed out the obstacles to 
overcome—the corrupted social and political systems—that Qutb characterized as 
jahiliyyah.85 Qutb constantly preached to Muslims that everything surrounding them was, 
in fact, jahiliyyah. He asserted that “if we look at the sources of modern of living, it 
becomes clear that the whole world is steeped in Jahiliyyah, [Ignorance of the Divine 
guidance] and all the marvelous material comforts and high level inventions do not 
diminish this ignorance.”86 In addition, he strongly opposed the submission to and the 
exercise of authority of some humans over others, and argued that Islam is not about 
obeying the authority of God’s servants but is about obeying God’s authority alone.87 
Third, he explicated the means to overcome the obstacles and achieve the goal—the 
jihad. Given the existence of jahiliyya societies, Qutb argued, religious men have a duty 
to create an Islamic social power in order to remove the social-political obstacles and 
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implement God’s will.88 Interestingly, Qutb’s work can be found in many bookstores 
throughout the Middle East, and some of his books are considered among the most 
influential Arabic works in the last century.89  
The assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat by an Egyptian radical group (al-
Jihad) in 1981 was a crucial development in the violent path of Salafi-jihadism. Al-Jihad, 
initially founded by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, was then led by Muhammad 
abd al-Salam Faraj (1954–1982). Faraj, who represented a radical wing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, highly criticized the organization for attempting to cooperate with the 
Egyptian government.90 He believed that al-Sadat’s death would spark a revolution in 
Egypt, and in fact, the assassination of the Egyptian president by al-Jihad permanently 
changed the nature of the Islamist struggle.91 Faraj, heavily influenced by ibn Taymiyya 
and Qutb, did not just consider jihad equal to the other five pillars of Islam, but he 
considered jihad as the most vital pillar.92  
Jihad was further re-conceptualized by al-Qaeda’s radical leadership. Abdullah 
Azzam (1941–1989), the co-founder of al-Qaeda (initially known as Maktab al-Khidmat) 
and a former Muslim Brotherhood member, was the first al-Qaeda leader involved in 
redefining the concept of jihad. In Defense of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation 
After Iman, Azzam separated jihad against the unbelievers into two types: offensive and 
defensive, and then clearly laid out the conditions when they should be invoked. 
Furthermore, Azzam re-conceptualized the traditional view of jihad as a collective duty, 
to an individual duty (fard ayn) that must be carried out by “every Muslim in the 
earth.”93 He also synthesized al-Qaeda’s vision in these lines:  
Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and, while focusing 
its way into society, puts up with heavy tasks and enormous sacrifices. 
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There is no ideology, neither earthly nor heavenly, that does not require a 
vanguard that gives everything it possesses in order to achieve victory for 
this ideology. It carries the flag all along the sheer endless and difficult 
path until it reaches its destination in the reality of life, since Allah has 
destined that it should make it and manifests itself. This vanguard 
constitutes al-Qaeda al-Sulbah for the expected society.94  
The next most important change in the Salafi-jihadist ideology was initiated by 
Ayman al-Zawahiri—the current leader of al-Qaeda. In Knights under the Prophet’s 
Banner, which is also al-Qaeda’s manifesto, al-Zawahiri argued that the primary 
targeting should shift from the “near enemy” (Middle Eastern countries) to the “far 
enemy” (e.g., The United States). He considered jihad as an efficient tool and argued that 
“the method of martyrdom operations is the most successful way of inflicting damage 
against the opponent and the least costly to the mujahedeen in casualties.”95 Moreover, 
al-Zawahiri managed to make a linkage of the local objectives (e.g., the Palestinian 
struggle) to the ones of the Global Jihad.96 Al-Zawahiri, worried that Western concepts 
such as nationalism or socialism were dominating local conflicts, argued that these 
concepts deviate from the true path of Islam and must be eliminated.97 Also, like many 
other Salafi-jihadists, al-Zawahiri has highlighted the importance of controlling a 
territory. He explained that “the jihad movement must adopt its plan on the basis of 
controlling a piece of land in the heart of the Islamic world on which it could establish 
and protect the state of Islam and launch a battle to restore a rational caliphate based on 
traditions of the Prophet.”98 It must be noted that most of al-Zawahiri’s theoretical 
approach is drawn from Sayid Qutb; therefore, key concepts like jihad and jahiliyya 
comprise the essence of al-Zawahiri’s thinking. 
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Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi is described by scholars  as the “godfather of Jihadi-
Salafi movement”,99 “the key contemporary ideologue in the jihadi intellectual universe,” 
and “the most influential living jihadi theorist.”100 Al-Maqdisi’s most important 
contribution to Salafi-jihadism is the development of the concept of al-wala wa-l-bara, 
turning it into a theory of enmity against the apostate rulers of the Islamic world.101 In 
addition, Al Maqdisi has written extensively about takfir. But unlike Sayid Qutb, who 
considered the entire society to be stepped in jahiliyya, al-Maqdisi applies takfir only on 
the rulers and the people that are directly engaged in assisting the regime and its laws 
(e.g.: police officers).102 In Democracy: A Religion, Al-Maqdisi argues that “democracy 
is an innovated religion, where its parents are false lords and its followers are slaves,” 
therefore, people who support the democratic process should be considered 
polytheists.103 Lastly, al-Maqdisi is well known as the spiritual mentor of Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi. However, the two of them had also their disagreements, especially when it came 
to the application of takfir. Unlike al-Zarqawi, who hugely depended on the use of takfir 
to excommunicate people in general, al-Maqdisi has constantly condemned Muslims who 
use extreme forms of takfir.104  
B. CONCLUSIONS  
The philosophies of many Salafi-jihadist groups are founded upon an historical 
lineage of Islamic thinking, beginning with the ideas of Ibn Taymimiyya up to the 
contemporary thinkers. ISIS and other Salafi-jihadist groups have been successful in 
making a connection between past and present Salafi-jihadist ideology in order to 
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legitimize their causes and motivate supporters. Therefore, understanding the evolution of 
the ideology can help the coalition forces fighting ISIS to conceptualize its ideology and 
to make accurate estimates about the future trends of the ideology.  
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IV. THE IMPACT OF ISIS ON SALAFI-JIHADIST IDEOLOGY 
Al Qaeda and ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] and groups 
like it are desperate for legitimacy. They try to portray themselves as 
religious leaders—holy warriors in defense of Islam. That’s why ISIL 
presumes to declare itself the “Islamic State.” And they propagate the 
notion that America—and the West, generally—is at war with Islam. 
That’s how they recruit. That’s how they try to radicalize young people. 
We must never accept the premise that they put forward, because it is a lie. 
Nor should we grant these terrorists the religious legitimacy that they seek. 
They are not religious leaders—they’re terrorists. And we are not at war 
with Islam. We are at war with people who have perverted Islam. 
—President Barack Obama105 
In the previous chapters, we provided background information on Salafi-jihadism 
and the evolution of this ideology, and we summarized the ideas of the prominent Salafi-
jihadist thinkers that have shaped the ideology to its current form. In Chapter IV, we 
combine insights from primary and secondary sources in order to depict ISIS’s 
“contribution” to the Salafi-jihadist ideology.  
Initially, we briefly discuss how ISIS emerged and managed to draw global 
attention. We then examine ISIS’s contribution to Salafi-jihadist ideology by analyzing 
the individual component parts of a terrorist organization, including ideology and 
strategy, territory, leadership, recruitment, and finance. Discussing one variable at a time 
enables us to better examine and describe the amount of significant change that ISIS tries 
to impose on the Salafi-jihadism. At the end of this chapter, we discuss about the 
prospects for ISIS’s ideology.  
A. BACKGROUND: HOW DID ISIS EMERGE? 
In 2014, ISIS announced the so-called “Islamic Caliphate,” and, from 2014 to 
2017, the group managed to control large parts of western Iraq and eastern Syria. Inside 
the group’s controlled territories, ISIS has set up its own unparalleled terror regime. The 
                                                 
105 Barak Obama, “Remarks by the President in Closing of the Summit on Countering Violent 
Extremism,” States News Service, February 18, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/02/18/remarks-president-closing-summit-countering-violent-extremism 
 28 
group has also inspired so-called “lone-wolf” attacks by either sympathizers or rare 
followers in Western countries. ISIS has installed its state of barbaric terror through the 
beheadings of many victims from all religions, the videos of executions by drowning, 
burning victims alive, shootings, and the rape of the Yazidi (and other) women. At 
present, fortunately, the group has almost faded from Iraq and soon enough from Syria; 
however, whether its legacy will fade with the territory the group controls remains highly 
questionable.   
ISIS is known by many acronyms and names: ISIS, ISIL, IS, and Daesh. ISIS 
stands for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and this is how the group was generally 
identified after it captured Mosul in 2014. The name asserts that the group controls Iraq 
and Syria. On the other hand, ISIL stands for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and 
is an exact translation of how the group refers to itself in Arabic—al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi 
al-Iraq wa al-Sham. Levant is the English term for al-Sham, which refers to the region of 
greater Syria (a territory from southern Turkey to Egypt).106 However, the group’s 
preferred name is IS, which stands for Islamic State. Among other things, this term 
signifies that the group is not limited to just Syria and Iraq and attempts to reach to all the 
Muslims in the world. Lastly, Daeshthe term used in the Middle East to refer to the 
groupis the acronym for the group’s name in Arabic, and is commonly used to 
challenge ISIS’s legitimacy.107 
The origin of ISIS can be traced to 2000, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 
established Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) with the intent of fighting the Jordanian 
government;108 however, it was the 2003 Iraq invasion that transformed the small 
militant group into the leading Salafi-jihadist organization. In fact, the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq by the United States is considered by many scholars and subject matter experts as the 
                                                 
106 Mohamad Abu Ruman, “Daesh or ISIS,” Al ghad News, accessed on September 30, 2017, 
http://www.alghad.com/search.php?search=abu+ruman. 
107 Ibid.   
108 Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Islamic State: From al‐Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate,” Middle East 
Policy 21, no. 4 (2014): 69. 
 29 
main factor that led to the formation of ISIS.109 This process was further accelerated by 
the decision of Paul Bremerthe United States appointed director of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority in Iraqto dissolve the Iraqi Army and to initiate the de-
Ba’athification policy. The policy left many of the Sunni military men and civil servants, 
who were undisputedly loyal to Saddam Hussein, without a job. JTJ, known as al-Qaeda 
in Iraq (or AQI) after al-Zarqawi officially pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden in the 
late 2004,110 quickly exploited the moment by drawing these Iraqi secular forces under a 
common cause to conduct joint insurgencies against the U.S. troops and a sectarian war 
against the Shia in Iraq.  
AQI’s brutal tactics, especially against the Shia, created a great gap between the 
group and al-Qaeda’s leadership. This gap expanded when the Mujahedeen Shura 
Council, which was established by al-Zarqawi just before he was killed in 2006,111 
changed the name of the organization from AQI to the Islamic State in Iraq (or ISI) 
without consulting with the al-Qaeda leadership.  
The Arab Spring, particularly the uprising in Syria, greatly affected the further 
transformation of ISIS. In 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the current leader of ISIS, 
emerged as the leader of ISI. Soon after the Arab Spring erupted among many Arab 
countries and, later, when the uprising in Syria against Assad turned into a civil war, the 
ISI entered Syria, renaming itself as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (or ISIS). The 
rebranding further angered al-Qaeda’s leaders because the organization already existed in 
Syria as the al-Nusra Front. The two groups then fought each other for some time until 
ISIS officially broke with al-Qaeda, while the al-Nusra Front remained loyal to al-Qaeda. 
In 2013, ISIS moved to capture two major Syrian cities: Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. Then, in 
2014, the group captured Mosul in Iraq, announced the establishment of the Caliphate, 
and asked all Muslims to pledge allegiance (bay’ah) to the new CaliphAbu Bakr al-
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Baghdadi.112 As of May 2017, ISIS has lost 70 percent of the area it controlled in Iraq 
and 51 percent of its territories in Syria (see Figure 2), compared to the territories the 
group controlled in August 2014.113  
 
Figure 2.  ISIS-controlled territories (as of May 2017).114 
B. ISIS’S IDEOLOGICAL EVOLUTION 
In this section, we examine ISIS’s contribution to Salafi-jihadist ideology by 
analyzing the individual component parts of a terrorist organization, including ideology 
and strategy, territory, leadership, recruitment, and finance. 
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1. Ideology and Strategy 
ISIS’s strategy, mostly drawn from the Salafi-jihadist ideology, follows a 
distinctive path to achieve its goals. The Salafi-jihadist groups’ ultimate objectives—as 
defined by their ideologies—are to overthrow the secular ruling regimes in Muslim 
countries, unite all the Muslims under one state, and impose Sharia law. ISIS, however, 
has its unique implementation mechanism of the Salafi-jihadist ideology it claims to 
follow.115 Daniel Byman asserts that “the group’s ideology is instrumentalized, twisted, 
and subordinated to other goals, enough that it is difficult to use ideology to predict the 
Islamic State’s actions.”116 In that light, a discussion of the primary strategic and 
ideological differences that ISIS brought to the Salafi-jihadist arena follows. 
First, ISIS’s strategy has prioritized sectarianism and the mass application of 
takfir to excommunicate Muslims, which has also been a real weakness for ISIS. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Ibn Taymiyyah was the first Salafi-jihadist thinker to 
discuss the concept of takfir, and he argued to his fellow Muslims that fighting the 
Mongols—the false Muslims—should be a priority over fighting the infidels.117 ISIS, 
however, took this concept and further expanded it. The organization has used a social 
polarization strategy—sectarianism—as a means of boosting recruitment,118 and is using 
the takfir concept in order to back up its strategy. Al-Zarqawi’s letter to Osama bin Laden 
best explains ISIS’s sectarianism strategy: 
These [the Shia] in our opinion are the key to change. I mean that 
targeting and hitting them in [their] religious, political, and military depth 
will provoke them to show the Sunnis their rabies and bare the teeth of the 
hidden rancor working in their breasts. If we succeed in dragging them 
into the arena of sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the 
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inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger and annihilating death at 
the hands of these Sabeans.119  
In contrast to al-Qaeda, a group that wants to reach out to the ummah and drag them into 
its cause, ISIS’s ideology has supported excessive religiosity and expanded the takfiri 
circle to include most of the Muslims in the world.120 
Second, a propaganda campaign and the professional use of media are additional 
strategies that distinguish ISIS from the other Salafi-jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda. 
Lina Khatib asserts that “propaganda is both a tool of recruitment for the organization 
and a tool of war that is often used to supplement military action, and sometimes to 
compensate for it.”121 In fact, the horrific violence ISIS releases for the general public to 
see is just one example of the group’s propaganda campaign. Furthermore, the group uses 
elements of ideology to strengthen its relations with the local population and control its 
territory.122 Soon after invading a new territory, ISIS engages in actions seen as 
promoting Sharia law.123 These actions reflect the ideology it claims to represent and 
increases the group’s legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. 
The media wing of ISIS distinguishes this group both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, in terms of the number of periodicals, media coverage, and high 
professionalism in this field, when compared to other terrorist organizations.124 Although 
ISIS advocates for a return to the practices of the first three generations of Muslims, the 
organization has made use of the rapid evolution in communication, the Internet, and 
social media to spread its ideology and recruit new members. The organization has 
established many media companies, such as al-Fourqan, al-Itessam, al-Hayat, Ajnad, 
Turjman, al-Saouriti, al-Batar, Caliphate, and al-Byan. It is also adept at using social 
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media including YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook.125 In fact, ISIS’s media campaign is 
so sophisticated that it has triggered a massive counter messaging campaign from the 
Global Coalition partners. The Global Counter ISIS Coalition Communications Working 
Group “regularly convenes over 30 member countries with media and tech companies to 
share information and strategies to counter violent extremist messages online and present 
positive alternative narratives.”126 These efforts have had mixed success. For example, 
although Twitter has managed to close down more than 635,000 ISIS-related accounts,127 
the organization continues to create new accounts as a method of outreach.128 
2. Territory  
The establishment of the proto-caliphate is the most visible accomplishment that 
distinguishes ISIS from the other Salafi-jihadist groups. While other Salafi-jihadist 
groups only operate within single territories, ISIS has managed to control various 
territories. ISIS’s main goal, unlike al-Qaeda’s, has been capturing, holding, and then 
governing more territory.129 The group challenges the postcolonial borders placed by the 
European powers after the dissolution of Ottoman Empire and aims to rebuild a pan-
Islamic state and expand it (baqiya wa tatamaddad).130  
The territory under ISIS control, particularly Syria, was also a very important part 
of the overall ISIS propaganda. ISIS ideologues proclaim that the apocalypse is 
underway, and Syria (Dabiq) is where the final battle will take place between the forces 
of God and His enemies.131 Moreover, Syria was also the heart of the Umayyad dynasty, 
one of most important of Islam’s dynasties that ruled the caliphate from 661–750 CE.132 
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Therefore, the establishment of the caliphate in Syria and Iraq, and the declaration of 
Raqqa as the capital of the caliphate, further increases the legitimacy of ISIS in the eyes 
of Salafi adherents. Al-Baghdadi, in his Mosul sermon, emphasized the importance that 
the caliphate had and said that it was a communal obligation that had not functioned 
properly for about 1,000 years.133 
Beyond its use for propaganda purposes, broad territorial control has enabled ISIS 
to exploit the financial resources of the areas it controls, increase the recruiting rate, and 
build up its terrorist networks.134 Consequentially, different from efforts targeting other 
Salafi-jihadist organizations that operate as sleeper cells and in small groups, the fight 
against ISIS requires conventional military operations rather than security forces to 
liberate the areas and the people under the group’s occupation.135 
3. Leadership 
The establishment of the caliphate and, most importantly, the selection of the right 
person to become the ruler—the Caliph—are crucial strategic steps that ISIS used to 
increase its legitimacy in the eyes of Salafi-jihadist adherents. The Caliph is considered 
the successor of the Prophet in ruling the Muslim nation (umma), and there are many 
hadiths stating that the Prophet’s successor should be from his Qurashi family. 
Historically, the Caliph was responsible to adopt the Muslim law (Sharia) over the 
Muslim community; therefore, he was considered as the symbol of the authority of the 
Sharia. Moreover, he was also known as the commander of the faithful (amir al-
muʾminin), responsible to defend and expand the Muslim territory, and to lead the prayers 
(as the Imam).136 
ISIS pays particular attention when it chooses its leaders in order to legitimize the 
group’s activities. On June 2014, a few days before the establishment of the Caliphate, 
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Abu Muhammad al-Adnani—a now-deceased former senior leader and the official 
spokesperson of ISIS—explained in an audio message that:  
The shūrā council—resolved to announce the establishment of the Islamic 
khilāfah, the appointment of a khalīfah for the Muslims, and the pledge of 
allegiance to the shaykh [sheikh], the mujāhid, the scholar who practices 
what he preaches, the worshipper, the leader, the warrior, the reviver, 
descendent from the family of the Prophet, the slave of Allah, Ibrāhīm Ibn 
‘Awwād Ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn ‘Alī Ibn Muhammad al-Badrī al-Hāshimī al-
Husaynī al-Qurashī by lineage, as-Sāmurrā’ī by birth and upbringing, al-
Baghdādī by residence and scholarship. And he has accepted the bay’ah 
[pledge of allegiance]. Thus, he is the imam and khalīfah for the Muslims 
everywhere.137 
In fact, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has two critical credentials that distinguish him from other 
Salafi-jihadist leaders, and that ultimately led to his selection as a Caliph. First, al-
Baghdadi’s family has long claimed to descend from the Prophet Muhammad’s tribe of 
Qurashi through the Prophet’s grandson Husayn (al-Bayt, the house of the Prophet).138 
Second, al-Baghdadi holds a Ph.D. in Islamic History from the University of Baghdad, 
which makes him an expert in al-Fiqh (Islamic law). 
4. Recruitment  
ISIS’s ideology has been so powerful that it has crossed geographical and cultural 
boundaries at an unprecedented rate. The group has used different kinds of recruiting 
techniques, such as financial inducement, intimidation, forced conscription in its 
controlled areas, and social media in order to increase its ranks.139 Even today, ISIS 
continues to attempt radicalizing people living in Western countries, either by the group’s 
propaganda or by making direct contact through the Internet, in hopes of convincing 
sympathizers to launch “lone wolf” terrorist attacks.140 
                                                 
137 Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, “This Is the Promise of Allah,” Al-Hayat Media Center, accessed on 
October 4, 2017, https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/shaykh-abc5ab-mue1b8a5ammad-al-
e28098adnc481nc4ab-al-shc481mc4ab-22this-is-the-promise-of-god22-en.pdf  
138 Fishman, The Master Plan, 149. 
139 Interview with Jordanian Directorate of Military Intelligence. 




The ISIS recruitment strategy has evolved and adapted over time. In the early 
stages, ISI, somewhat similar to al-Qaeda, paid particular attention to choosing the 
recruiter and the recruits. The recruiter had to be from the specific area that ISI aimed to 
recruit; he or she had to be part of the same tribe as the potential recruits; and more 
importantly, the recruiter had to have considerable knowledge of religion (Quran and 
hadith).141 Waleed al Rawi, a retired general in the Iraqi Army, explains that the group’s 
recruiter was responsible to recruit four other people in order to establish his own jihadi 
cell.142 The recruiter was then responsible to set up the recruits’ training program—
physical, tactical, and Internet and communication training.143 Moreover, ISI mostly 
targeted young people in their twenties, in schools and universities, in mosques, and in 
charity organizations; those who were not only physically strong, but that also lived 
under desperate economic conditions.144 
The current recruitment strategy reflects the group’s desperate need of new 
members. The recruitment strategy has transformed into a mass recruitment approach, 
partly because of what the caliphate represents in theory and partly because of ISIS 
involvement in fighting on many fronts. In contrast to some other Salafi-jihadist 
organizations, such as the al-Nusra Front, ISIS does not have a robust vetting process for 
new recruits that want to join the group.145 Peter Neumann, Director of the International 
Center for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR), asserts that ISIS’ approach toward 
individual recruits is: “If you’re a Muslim, you’re already part of the Caliphate. So even 
if you’re too fat, or too old to be a fighter, we’ll find something else for you to do. You 
have a right to emigrate. We’ll find a place for you.”146 
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Moreover, females have particularly been targeted by ISIS either as recruiters or 
recruits. Female recruiters play a very influential role, either by recruiting their family 
members or by supporting members in their close circles.147 In fact, females, beyond 
directly recruiting, play an important role in morally supporting family members who 
have joined ISIS.148 Female members are also valuable as online agents or in other roles 
for spreading ISIS ideology.149 Recently, on October 4, 2017, the Jordanian Supreme 
Court found guilty a female ISIS member who was attempting to recruit new members 
through acts of prostitution near some refugee camps in the northern part of the 
country.150 The role of women, though, extends beyond recruiting. Al-Zarqawi himself 
encouraged female membership in his organization by appraising the first female suicide 
operation in Tel Afar, Iraq, on September 2005.151 
5. Finance  
ISIS’s financial organization and operations are distinct from those of other 
Salafi-jihadist organizations,152 and the group’s territorial control of a large area in Iraq 
and Syria has been very beneficial in terms of financial income. Presumably, unlike other 
Salafi-jihadist organizations that rely on external donation, ISIS’s obtains funding 
generated primarily from the territory that the group has controlled.153 ISIS has obtained 
its revenues from three primary sources, and the diversity of these sources of income has 
been the group’s key to success. ISIS has primarily generated its funding from looting 
banks, operating local oil infrastructure, and engaging in illicit taxation of goods, 
extortion, and human trafficking.154 In mid-2016, ISIS controlled roughly 60 percent of 
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the oil wells in Syria, and the oil revenues were estimated at 250 million USD to 350 
million USD per year.155 Second, ISIS has used kidnaping for ransom to generate 
revenues. The Financial Action Task Force has estimated that ISIS has raised revenue 
ranging from 20 million USD to 45 million USD through the kidnapping business.156 
Third, ISIS relies on external donations.157 Although this source of revenue is minimal 
compared to the two sources mentioned previously, it helps to diversify the 
organization’s financial portfolio. Early on, external donations were clearly coming from 
sources on the Arabian Peninsula, however, over time, these contributions have 
waned.158 
C. PROSPECTS FOR THE SURVIVAL OF ISIS’S IDEOLOGY 
Whoever thinks that we fight to protect some land or some authority, or 
that victory is measured thereby, has strayed far from the truth. … O 
America, would we be defeated and you be victorious if you were to take 
Mosul or Sirte or Raqqa? … Certainly not! We would be defeated and you 
victorious only if you were able to remove the Quran from Muslims’ 
hearts. 
—Abu Muhammad al-Adnani159 
While the fight against ISIS seems to be on a good track, it remains highly 
questionable whether the end of ISIS will also be the end of the Western struggle against 
extremist ideology. Many subject matter experts argue that the territorial defeat of ISIS 
will not be a “true” defeat because the idea of the caliphate will exist long beyond the 
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ISIS proto-state.160 Simon Cottee asserts that “history will assuredly repudiate ISIS, just 
as it has decisively repudiated the utopian experiment of Soviet communism”; however, 
he adds that “today’s caliphate supporters can say: the caliphate never failed—it was 
never tried.”161 Colin Clarke, a political scientist at RAND Corporation, argues that 
“predictions of the group’s ultimate demise are premature.”162 Clarke asserts that “ISIS is 
being forced to change its strategy and tactics, but it has been proactively preparing for 
the next phase of the conflict.”163  
Having said that, there is no doubt that ISIS is constantly planning the post-
caliphate phase; however, the structure and the way that the resilient group will appear in 
the future is still a mystery. The Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) of JAF—
when asked about the future of ISIS—believes that what remains of ISIS “will build itself 
again, potentially with new names.”164 However, the DMI asserts that the new factions 
will not meet the level of success that ISIS did.165 It is very likely that ISIS operatives 
will spontaneously spread throughout the world, targeting the unstable regions such as 
Libya, Sinai in Egypt, and other countries in Africa in order to establish new areas of 
operation. This move might rebrand ISIS as an international jihadi movement—a 
worldwide terrorist network—similar to al-Qaeda. In fact, ISIS already has sympathizers 
in Afghanistan, and, besides their strongholds in Yemen, the group may try to expand its 
influence in Iran, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, India, and China. Parallel to that, due to 
the group’s expertise in digital technology, ISIS will continue to remain a threat in the 
online world, either by recruiting new members and motivating the existing ones, or by 
carrying out cyber-attacks. 
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Another potential course of action that ISIS might pursue is to scatter and ask its 
sympathizers to conduct “personal jihad” wherever they can. As Professor Glenn 
Robinson explains in “The Four Waves of Global Jihad, 1979–2017,” “personal jihad” is 
the fourth and the current wave of global jihad that began with the collapse of the Taliban 
regime in 2001, and focuses “on the idea of surviving to fight another day.”166 This 
strategy, modeled by a jihadist writer known as Abu Musab al-Suri, focuses on 
conducting “lone wolf” attacks or remote operations in order to keep hope alive in the 
minds of Salafi-jihadists and, at the same time, impose a constant threat to their 
adversaries.167 ISIS began applying this strategy especially after the group continued 
losing control of its territories in Iraq and Syria,168 and it is very likely that ISIS will 
continue to encourage personal jihad in the future due to the practicality of this strategy. 
This course of action might be taken in conjunction with the first option discussed 
previously (i.e., rebrand as an international jihadist movement), or as a completely 
separate course of action.  
A third likelihood is that ISIS might have reached its apex when the group 
established the proto-caliphate in 2014 and, thereafter, began degrading until the group 
will soon stop existing. In fact, the available polling data reveal that ISIS has made itself 
very unpopular in a very short period of time (see Figure 3).  
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Figure 3.  Level of ISIS popularity in the Muslim world (March 2015).169 
ISIS has made a large number of adversaries who are determined to defeat the group. 
Currently, ISIS is being fought by the Global Coalition’s 73 members, Kurdish forces, 
Shia militias (e.g., The Popular Mobilization Forces), the Syrian regime and its allies, 
Syrian rebel groups, and by other Salafi-jihadist groups, such as al-Nusra Front. It is 
likely that any remaining members of ISIS, after the group loses all its territories, will 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. THESIS PURPOSE 
This thesis asked the following primary question: To what extent does ISIS mark 
a new stage in the development of Salafi-jihadism? 
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
Based on a thorough examination of primary and secondary sources, this study 
concludes that ISIS has introduced three major tenets to the Salafi-jihadism trend, of 
which only the second one will probably outlast ISIS proto-caliphate. First, sectarianism 
and the mass application of takfir to excommunicate Muslims have been at the core of 
ISIS’s strategy. Although many Salafi-jihadist thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyyah have 
discussed the concept of takfir and argued to their fellow Muslims that fighting the false 
Muslims should be a priority over fighting the infidels, these ideologues have never 
supported the extermination of Shia in the way ISIS does. In contrast to ISIS leadership, 
most of the Salafi-jihadist leaders see the Shia as a group of misguided people who 
demonstrate bid’ah (innovation) rather than as a group of disbelievers who deserve to 
die.170 Moreover, the famous al-Zarqawi letter to Osama bin Laden best explains ISIS’s 
sectarianism strategy,171 which is also the main divide that the group has with al-Qaeda. 
Nevertheless, it is most likely that ISIS’s excess in the application of takfir will not be 
adopted by other Salafi-jihadist groups in the future because of the negative effects that 
this “experiment” had on ISIS.172 
Second, the establishment of the proto-caliphate by ISIS is a huge milestone in the 
history of Salafi-jihadism. While other Salafi-jihadist groups only allowed themselves to 
dream about the possibility of establishing a caliphate, ISIS made it happen. Even though 
                                                 
170 Ayman al-Zawahiri, ”Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi (English Translation),” Combating Terrorist 
Center (July 2005), https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Zawahiris-Letter-to-Zarqawi-
Translation.pdf  
171 See Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, “Letter to Osama bin Laden,” U.S. Department of State, last 
modified February 2004, https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm. 
172 Interview with Jordanian Directorate of Military Intelligence, August 2017.  
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there is no doubt that ISIS’s proto-caliphate will soon be ended, it is likely that the idea of 
this achievement will live forever, and, most importantly, it will serve as an 
encouragement for future generations of Salafi-jihadists’ to undertake a similar endeavor.  
ISIS’s ingenuity to establish a territorial control has been particularly beneficial 
for the group in terms of propaganda and financial incomes. On the one hand, ISIS, 
through establishing the proto-caliphate, has reached the hearts and minds of many Salafi 
adherents, whose ultimate objective is to unite under one Muslim state and impose Sharia 
law. On the other hand, broad territorial control has enabled ISIS to exploit the financial 
resources of the areas it controls, thus, becoming “the wealthiest terrorist group in 
history.”173 In this regard, because of this high-payoff strategy, ISIS’s idea about taking 
and controlling territory will most likely be incorporated by other Salafi-jihadist groups 
in the future.  
Third, its robust propaganda campaign and professional use of media are 
additional new characteristics that distinguish ISIS from the other Salafi-jihadist groups. 
Lina Khatib asserts that ISIS propaganda “is both a tool of recruitment for the 
organization and a tool of war that is often used to supplement military action, and 
sometimes to compensate for it.”174 The horrific violence that ISIS released for the 
general public to see is just one example of the group’s propaganda campaign. Moreover, 
although ISIS advocates for a return to the practices of the first three generations of 
Muslims, the group has made masterful use of the rapid evolution in communication, the 
Internet, and social media to spread its ideology and recruit new members. Its media wing 
distinguishes ISIS, both qualitatively and quantitatively in terms of the number of 
periodicals, media coverage, and high professionalism in this field, when compared to 
other terrorist organizations.175 In fact, the group has used social media not only as a 
method of outreach, but also to cultivate a sense of legitimacy, which to some extent has 
given results.176  
                                                 
173 Colin P. Clarke et al., Financial Futures of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. 
174 Khatib, “The Islamic State’s Strategy,” 11. 
175 Interview with Jordanian Directorate of Military Intelligence, August 2017. 
176 Khatib, “The Islamic State’s Strategy,” 11. 
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Finally, this thesis concludes that ISIS marks a new stage in the development of 
Salafi-jihadism. Although ISIS has attempted to leave a permanent legacy (such as 
sectarianism), we believe the establishment of the Islamic caliphate is the only lasting 
impact that ISIS will have on Salafi-jihadist ideology. In fact, ISIS’s ideology, which is 
radical even by Salafi-jihadist standards, has been rejected by many Salafi-jihadist 
leaders and scholars (e.g., bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, al-Maqdisi, etc.). Furthermore, even 
though ISIS has gained a terrible reputation for its brutalities, the group did succeed in 
establishing a proto-caliphate, and the memory of this success will undoubtedly outlast 
the proto-caliphate itself and will inspire future generations of Salafi-jihadists, whether 
they undertake the same endeavor, or pursue other alternatives.  
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